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Abstract : Islamic banks are growing rapidly with annual growth rates of 17.6% between 
2009 to 2013 and 19.7% from 2014 to date. This level of growth is projected to continue 
into the future. Islamic banks now operate in more than 75 countries with a value of 
approximately $920 trillion of bank assets. Islamic banks are increasingly being seen 
as good long-term value propositions and are serving both Muslim and non-Muslim 
customers across international markets. Despite the rapid growth in Islamic finance, 
the underpinning corporate governance rules and regulations are at an embryonic stage 
of development with little attention having been paid to them. The purpose of this pa-
per is to help fill that gap by exploring a conceptual model of corporate governance for 
Islamic banks based on both Islamic finance principles while fused with elements of 
corporate governance standards from Western theories and codes, primarily the UK, 
and thereby ensure that good governance is in place in Islamic banks. The paper links 
the predominant corporate governance theories of Principal/Agent, Stakeholder and 
Stewardship with practice based corporate governance codes and explores the poten-
tial of applying stewardship theory to Islamic banks. Islamic principles emphasis is 
on real assets rather than debt as is the case in Western Banks and as a consequence 
this paper offers the conclusion that the more prudent approach to banking used by 
Islamic banks could be used as a model for Western banks and thereby deliver a more 
sustainable future and maintain confidence in banks and substitute for the need for 
taxpayer support, such as the guaranteed deposit scheme, which acts as a backstop 
under the Western approach.
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Introduction
In an article in the Guardian newspaper (2014 December 4) entitled “Could 
Islamic finance save capitalism?” Irfan (2013) posed the question: Where is 
there a place for ethics and morality in the global economy? He went on to 
question whether it is sufficient to rely on governments and central banks to 
tweak at the margins of financial regulation or whether the global economy 
is in need of a root and branch reformation, effectively a revolution in capi-
talism. At around the same time London became the first non-Muslim city to 
host the world Islamic economic forum at which David Cameron, the then 
prime minister of the UK, announced the intention to create a  £200 mln 
Islamic bond. With this backcloth it may be opportunistic for the UK to fur-
ther develop Islamic finance as part of a bigger post-Brexit strategy as post-
-Brexit UK becomes a reality.
Islamic banking is different from its Western counterparts primarily due to 
a difference in focus. Islamic banks focus on asset values, viewed as actuali-
ties, while Western banks are credit focused, essentially future potentialities. 
Western banks attempt to assess future income streams when assessing whether 
to loan money, a case of potentialities rather than actualities. Islamic principles 
have been suggested as a solution to the failings in western banking, failings 
which manifested themselves in the 2007/8 banking crisis. Unpalatable as the 
idea of religion and dogma may seem at first sight to scientific focused eyes, 
leaving the religious aspects to one side and instead focusing on the principles 
and philosophy developed over hundreds of years in the Islamic tradition pro-
vides a reassuringly prudential approach to decision making which resonates 
well with sound economic thinking.
Modern banks began offering sharia-compliant products in the mid-1970s. 
Since then it has grown into a global industry with total assets of around $920 
trillion (Ernst and Young, 2016). The spectacular growth in Islamic banks 
over the last 10 years with annual growth rates averaging 17.6% between 2009 
to 2013 and 19.7% from 2014 onwards (Ernst and Young, 2015) suggests that 
Islamic banks have a value proposition that is attractive to the global investing 
community from both Muslim and non-Muslim persuasion. To date, corpo-
rate governance in the banking sector has been researched almost exclusively 
in terms of conventional, western banking systems. Despite the rapid growth 
of Islamic finance over the last two decades, research into corporate govern-
ance in Islamic banks is still at an early stage (Archer & Karim, 2007; Mollah 
& Zaman, 2015).
The aim of this paper is to fill a gap in the knowledge and understanding by 
exploring the idea of fusing principles of Islamic finance with elements of ma-
ture Western corporate governance codes and established theories underpin-
ning corporate governance in order to model existing Corporate Governance 
practice in Islamic banking and to propose a conceptual model of best prac-
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tice for future discussion amongst interested parties. The paper considers ful-
ly-fledged Islamic banks it does not consider Islamic windows which have 
been developed by some Western banks as an extension to their conventional 
banking offerings.
This paper begins by considering both corporate governance theorising in 
general, then examines Islamic finance, Sharia and other forms of Islamic legal 
and moral systems. The methodology adopted in the paper follows a qualitative 
philosophy with an exploratory focus on conceptualising Stewardship theory 
as the principle theory of relevance to corporate governance in Islamic banks. 
The paper goes on to develop and discuss a proposed conceptual framework 
which is intended to be helpful in understanding the gaps between practice in 
Islamic and western banking systems, and points towards the conditions needed 
for development of a code of best practice aimed specifically at Islamic banks.
Early in the development of European corporate governance standards 
Cadbury (1992, p. 15) defined corporate governance as “…the system by which 
companies are directed and controlled. Boards of directors are responsible for 
the governance of their companies. The shareholders’ role in governance is to 
appoint the directors and the auditors and to satisfy themselves that an appro-
priate governance structure is in place.”
While the literature on corporate governance has widened considerably 
beyond this 25 year old definition, in a narrow sense the above definition in-
corporates the mechanisms used internally within corporations to monitor 
managerial decisions and evaluate firms’ performance. In moving beyond the 
financial aspects in which Cadbury is set, it is helpful to consider contextual 
issues. Solomon (2013) says, for example, that corporate governance is affect-
ed by the local culture and regulation and consequently corporate governance 
might differ from one country to another (Nordberg, 2011; Solomon, 2013). 
The cultural impact on corporate governance is at the heart of this paper and 
the premise that one-size does not fit all.
Drawing on the above, Islamic Financial Institutions (IFIs) were outlined by 
Warde (2000, p. 5) as “those that are based, in their objectives and operations, 
on Koranic principles. They are thus set apart from ‘conventional’ institutions, 
which have no such preoccupations.”
In particular, Khan and Mirakhor (1989, p. 40) defines Islamic banks as ones 
in which “…depositors are treated as if they were shareholders of the bank. 
Consequently, depositors are not guaranteed the nominal value, or a prede-
termined rate of return, on their deposits. If the bank makes profits, then the 
shareholder (depositor) would be entitled to receive a certain proportion of 
these profits. On the other hand, if the bank incurs loss the depositor is expect-
ed to share in these as well, and receive a negative rate of return.”
The Central Bank of Malaysia (2014, p. 3) defines Investment Account 
Holders (IAHs) as “Investment Accounts such as Islamic deposits on current ac-
count, deposit accounts, savings accounts or other similar accounts (e.g. general 
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investment account and specific investment account) under any Sharia contract 
which is non-principal guaranteed”. Drawing upon the ideas above, this paper 
investigates the extent to which stewardship theory is appropriate for Islamic 
banks and specifically of relevance to the investment account holders (IAHs).
The paper is structured as follows: firstly, this paper provides a literature 
review drawing on the received wisdom in corporate governance in terms of 
the fundamental theories underpinning corporate governance rules and prin-
ciples and the significance of corporate governance in banks with a specific 
focus on Islamic banking. This section concludes with the literature of active 
shareholding and their role in enhancing a stewardship culture. Secondly, the 
paper presents two models. Figure1 provides a conceptual model based on the 
UK Stewardship Code published by the Financial Reporting Council, initial-
ly in 2010 in response to the collapse of major banks in the UK, and then re-
vised in 2012. To our knowledge no other researchers have attempted to pro-
vide a diagrammatic presentation of this code. In addition, Figure 2 provides 
the main conceptual model introduced by this research. The model engages 
with the unique requirement of Islamic banks’ governance in general and the 
case of Investment account holders in particular. Moreover, it utilizes three 
leading theories of corporate governance: Agency theory, Stakeholder theo-
ry and Stewardship theory, the last of these being the distinguishing theory. 
After, a discussion of the limitations of this research and recommendations 
for future research will be provided. The paper concludes with a summary of 
the main ideas and an elaboration of its potential significance for practice and 
policy. The principle contribution lies in examining the unique position that 
IAHs play in Islamic banks.
1. Literature review
1.1. The importance of corporate governance
The interest in corporate governance has increased rapidly over the last two 
decades driven by catastrophic scandals all around the world such as Enron in 
the US, Royal Bank of Scotland in the UK, Parmalat in Italy, China Aviation oil 
and many others (Letza, Kirkbride, Sun & Smallman, 2008; Letza, 2017; Mallin, 
2013). Therefore, there is a perceived universal need for robust and effective 
governance structures in order to protect all stakeholders from such collapses.
Cadbury (2002) argued that corporate governance is a key driver in the 
world’s economic and political strategies due to the significant growth of in-
ternational businesses. Supporting Sir Adrian Cadbury’s contention are several 
research projects that conclude that countries with developed corporate govern-
ance structures attract more investors. Moreover, corporate governance plays 
a key role not only in protecting the interest of existing shareholders but also 
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in attracting potential investors. Thus, corporations need a robust and trans-
parent internal governance structure and a sound regulatory environment in 
order to sustain and compete in international markets (Cadbury, 2002; Abu-
-Tapanjeh, 2009; Mallin, 2013).
1.2. Theoretical underpinning
‘Corporate Governance’ as a  term and its daily usage in both the press and 
academic literature is a relatively new phenomenon of the last three decades 
(Mallin, 2013). However, the main theories which participated in evolving 
and shaping the contemporary corporate governance models could be traced 
back to earlier years (Clarke, 2004; Mallin, 2013). Additionally, Mallin (2013) 
highlighted that corporate governance theories were influenced by different 
aspects including; finance, economics, accounting, law and organizational be-
haviour. According to Mallin choosing the appropriate theory in corporate 
governance is affected by various aspects such as the corporations’ culture, ac-
tivities, time frame, and ownership structure and notably in which country/
countries the corporation operates.
Two theories dominate the literature on corporate governance, principal/
agent theory and stakeholder theory. These theories are often presented by their 
relative supporters as the fundamental model underpinning corporate govern-
ance. This has resulted in the debate on corporate governance being polarised 
into two camps, the shareholding theory camp with an emphasis on principal/
agent theory and stakeholder theory camp emphasising a wider range of in-
terested parties such as; customers, employees, suppliers, lenders, society and 
shareholders (Jensen, 2001; Letza, Sun & Kirkbride, 2004; Mallin, 2013), with 
each camp claiming superiority over the other. The debate presents a seemingly 
natural division between the two, either one or the other, with apparently no 
opportunity for consideration of merge between the two. However, an alter-
native view is presented by Letza and Sun (2004). They suggest that instead of 
a clear-cut stable boundary between the two theories where a static and entita-
tive conception is presented in the real world of Boardrooms, decisions will be 
made and policies agreed based on a dynamic analysis of the constantly chang-
ing organisational environment where both the shareholder and stakeholder 
perspectives are constantly being debated and considered. Consequently, the 
perceived theoretical division between shareholders and stakeholders exists 
only in theory and not in practice. They proposed a processual approach to 
the understanding of corporate governance where both the shareholder theory 
and the stakeholder theory are seen as relevant and applied in practice when 
circumstances dictate their application. Thus, it is concluded that there is no 
one “best fit all” theory for all countries and corporations. In conclusion, many 
scholars such as (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson, 
1997; Jensen, 2001; Clarke, 2004; Letza et al., 2004; Letza & Sun, 2002; Mallin, 
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2013; Nordberg, 2010) associate the concept of corporate governance with 
three main theories: agency theory, stakeholder theory and stewardship the-
ory. Nonetheless, theories that are deliberated in the literature go well beyond 
the three and include many other theories such as class hegemony, manage-
rial hegemony, transaction cost theory, institutional theory and prospect the-
ory (Mallin, 2013; Cuevas-Rodriguez, Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 2012). The 
three theories discussed above are the most commonly referred to when con-
sidering corporate governance of both Islamic and conventional banks (Obid 
& Naysary, 2014).
Shareholding versus Stakeholding
One of the major dilemmas in corporate governance is identifying the purpose 
behind corporations and whose benefit it should be serving. The debate in the 
corporate governance literature is polarised into shareholding and stakehold-
ing models (Letza et al., 2004).
Friedman (2007) claimed that all of the business’s activities and manag-
ers’ decisions should focus on generating maximum profits and maximising 
shareholders’ value. Furthermore, Davis et al. (1997) argues that as both agents 
and principles aim to maximise their own utility based on the assumption of 
the ‘homo-economics’ model of man, where directors as opportunistic and 
self-serving. The main objective of the agency theory is to reduce the agency 
cost arising from the divergence in principal-agent interests. Therefore, agen-
cy theorists provide several governance mechanisms which could be applied 
to achieve that goal including financial incentive schemes aimed at aligning 
principal and agent interests or a governance structure aimed at controlling 
the agent.
Freeman (2010) argued that maximising owner’s wealth could only be 
achieved by taking into consideration all stakeholders’ interests. Furthermore, 
Jensen (2001, p. 13) moves to an enlightened standpoint by claiming that as 
“firms should pay attention to all their constituencies, the theory is unassailable. 
Taken this far stakeholder theory is completely consistent with value maximi-
zation or value-seeking behaviour, which implies that managers must pay at-
tention to all constituencies that can affect the value of the firm.”
Jensen (2001) introduced the enlightened value maximisation which adopt 
the classic stakeholder theory principle as long as it participates in creating 
long-term value maximisation and not only short-term profits. On the other 
hand, Mallin (2013) describes the stakeholder theory as the ‘juxtapositions’ to 
the agency theory that focuses on a wider range of people that are affected in 
the decision making process including employees, suppliers, customers, lenders 
and governments. Furthermore, corporate governance mechanisms including 
monitoring processes and board construction might differ based on the coun-
ty of operation. For instance, the so-called Anglo-Saxon model of corporate 
governance emphasis on maximising the shareholders wealth where in other 
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 models such as the German and Japanese models tend to take a long-term stra-
tegic view and embrace a broader prospective.
Many scholars in Islamic finance claim that Islamic banks should adopt 
a  “societal model” which acknowledges the rights and needs of substantial 
stakeholders including depositors, investment account holders and employees 
(Grais & Pellegrini, 2006; Archer & Abdel Karim, 2007; Iqbal & Mirakhor, 2007).
Agency theory versus Stewardship theory
Corporations are the spine of all advanced economies in the world. Most of 
these corporations evolved from small trading entities enabling their stock-
holders to trade in regional markets, and in some cases multibillion dollar cor-
porations trading in global financial markets. As these corporations grow, for 
most the entrepreneurial founders transfer the running of the business onto 
professionals giving rise to separation between ownership and management. 
Governing firms requires a professional level of monitoring of all fundamental 
components including strategy, human forces, marketing, financial account-
ing and structure also assuring their stakeholders that all mechanisms are in 
harmony (Nordberg, 2010).
Agency theory is a key factor in shaping corporate structure and business 
policies. Agency theory was founded on the assumption that directors (Agents) 
and owners (Principals) are both attempting to maximise their own utility, of-
ten referred to as ‘slack’. In its original form, agency theory adopted a simplis-
tic approach of two actors, namely, agent and principal (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976; Davis et al., 1997). Davis et al. argue that there is a perceived need for 
a new theory which is able to explain the complex nature of organisational be-
haviour. Additionally, this theory should aim to explore the affairs in corpora-
tions taking into consideration non-economic factors.
Stewardship theory was introduced as a revolutionary concept able to ex-
plain relationships based on other noneconomic behavioural assumptions 
(Donaldson & Davis, 1991; Davis et al., 1997). Rather than management being 
seen as utility maximisers as proposed in agency theory, stewardship theory 
views management as stewards unlike agency theory which requires either in-
centives or a monitoring mechanism to ensure harmony. Stewardship theory 
is capable of introducing an element of trust in the agent to deliver harmony. 
Davis et al., (1997) states that stewardship theory and agency theory are com-
plementing each other, and there is no one-best-way of thinking and therefore, 
there is no perfect theory. However, reconciliation is required to differentiate 
between both theories and be able to determine which one suits best the or-
ganisation’s circumstances to achieve the best outcome for major stakeholders.
The agency problem was recognized in the literature of Islamic finance by 
many scholars such as Safieddine (2009), Obid and Naysary (2014). Moreover, 
Safieddine (2009) argued that Islamic banks suffer from a more complex agency 
problem accrued from the separation of not only management and ownership 
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but also from the separation between cash flow and control. Therefore, any at-
tempt to develop a corporate governance model of Islamic banks should take 
into consideration the additional complexities of agency. On the other hand, 
some scholars, including Bhatti and Bhatti (2009), Obid and Naysary (2014), 
argued that corporate governance in Islamic banks should be based on the 
stewardship theory since all the parties of the bank are viewed as stewards and 
perform their duties in the ‘spirit of partnership in line with Islamic beliefs . 
Finally, Obid and Naysary (2014) present what they call a‘development of an 
integrated theoretical framework of Sharia governance’. This theoretical frame-
work represents the relationships between the three main theories deliberated 
in Islamic banking. Obid and Naysary go on to discuss these relationships from 
a theoretical stand and suggests how it might lead to a better governance per-
formance. However, Obid and Naysary’s ideas are not linked to practice nor do 
they discuss the internal mechanisms of Islamic banks. Nonetheless, this frame-
work enhances the idea of ‘one-size does not fit all’ from a theoretical prospec-
tive and supports the adaption of the three main theories as discussed above.
1.3. The significance of corporate governance in banks
Financial institutions in general and banks in particular have caught the at-
tention of scholars and governments over the last three decades due to their 
major influence on an economies’ progression (John, De Masi & Paci, 2016). 
Corporate governance of banks has also caught the attention of policy mak-
ers and academics due to banks significant role in society (Macey & O’Hara, 
2003; Levine, 2004; Walker, 2009; Dermine, 2013; de Haan & Vlahu, 2016; 
John et al., 2016).
Archer and Abdel Karim (2007) argued that corporate governance in all 
banks, irrespective of any specific nuance such as Islamic or Western, should 
be the subject of particular attention and requires a unique governance struc-
ture due to three main factors. Firstly, banks are more “opaque” than other cor-
porations, which causes more complex agency problems. Secondly, the heavy 
regulation facing the banking sector provides much greater externally imposed 
control than most sectors. Thirdly, significant government ownership of many 
banks resulting in concentrated shareholding and consequently the conven-
tional understanding of the principal/agent theory based on dispersed share-
holding is of lesser significance.
Extending the work of Archer and Abdel Karim (2007) John et al. (2016) 
claim that banks suffer from a more complex agency problem than non-finan-
cial firms due the significance of debtholders and divergence between share-
holders’ interests and debtholders’ interests. John et al. (2016) stated that banks 
are unique and therefore it should be treated with a higher level of attention. 
The uniqueness of the banks could be attributed to many elements. Firstly, for 
most banks the leverage ratio, measured as the ratio of debt to equity, is very 
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high, often 90 percent, while in the non-financial sector the leverage ratio rare-
ly exceeds 30 percent. Secondly, the conflict between shareholder-debthold-
ers mentioned earlier. Thirdly, banks are key players in society and potentially 
could have a larger impact on a wider range of stakeholders than non-financial 
firms, the 2007/8 banking crisis is an example of this wider impact. Finally, as 
discussed above, banks have a complex and an opaque asset structure which 
might necessitate a more complex governance mechanism.
1.4. The case of Islamic banks
Warde (2000) argues that the definition of an Islamic bank is much deeper 
than the popular view of “interest-free” banks. It includes a wider variety of 
products and services that are compliant with fundamental Islamic principles. 
Warde (2000) and Iqbal and Mirakhor (2007) highlight two main features in 
Islamic banking. First, Islamic banking is based on the risk-sharing model i.e. 
lenders and borrowers must participate not only in profits but also in losses. 
Second, Islamic banking pays major attention to economic development and 
seeks to develop social well-being through specific investments and utilizing 
alms-giving known in Islam as “Zakat”. Zakat was defined as “the compulsory 
giving of a set proportion of one’s wealth to charity” (Religions, 2009), this ap-
plies to both individual and institutions. Despite the rapid growth of Islamic 
banks there is a gap in the literature on corporate governance in Islamic banking 
(Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009; Abdullah Saif Alnasser & Muhammed, 2012; Muneeza 
& Hassan, 2014; Mollah & Zaman, 2015).
The governance structures in Islamic banks differ from similar counterparts 
in the west. This divergence is largely attributed to the unique business model 
of IBs since these institutions include unique items in their balance sheets such 
as alms-giving. Additionally, IBs require a secondary board known as a Sharia 
supervisory board (SSB), the objective of the SSB is to assure all stakeholders 
that the banks’ activities and investments are in line with Sharia law (Abdullah 
Saif Alnasser & Muhammed, 2012). Consequently, IBs require a unique com-
prehensive governance structure enabling all additional elements unique to 
Islamic finance to be captured.
Archer and Abdel Karim (2007) and Abdullah Saif Alnasser and Muhammed 
(2012) argued that a good governance structure requires aligning the interest of 
the banks’ management with its wide range of stakeholders not only the bank’s 
shareholders. Additionally, there is a substantial need for a proper incentive 
scheme that allows a more effective supervisory mechanism to motivate man-
agers to be more efficient in allocating banks’ resources. Finally, complying 
with Sharia rules and principles is essential to establish a relevant governance 
structure in order to avoid any reputational damage.
IBs consist of two boards: the traditional Board of Directors (BODs) and 
a Shariah Board (SB) as with the traditional role of non-executive directors, 
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the role of the SB fluctuate from advisory to supervisory depending on the 
regulations and codes of the countries in which they are operate and provide 
an audit of the banks’ activities to make sure that they are compliance with 
Sharia principles. Furthermore, the divergence in the governance structure is 
not limited between IBs and its counterparts in the conventional markets but 
also between IBs in different Muslim regions such as the study by Grassa and 
Matoussi (2014) which found that board structure is affected by cultural, so-
cial and economic factors in GCC and Southeast Asia.
Moreover, Grassa and Matoussi (2014) claimed that corporate governance 
in IBs is required to be different from its conventional counterparts in three 
substantial areas; Firstly, All IBs must comply with the Shariah law consequent-
ly any non-compliance risk might lead to reputational damage and financial 
losses. Secondly, the role of the investment accounts holders (IAHs) and their 
unique role in IBs. Thirdly, the argument by (Claessens, 2006, cited in Grassa 
& Matoussi, 2014) that IBs generally operate in less transparent systems and 
weaker regulated and monitored markets.
All the above underpin the importance of having a  unique governance 
structure for Islamic banks. As Chapra (1992, p. 19) citing the famous Islamic 
philosopher Al-Ghazali (died 1111) states “The very objective of the Shari ah 
is to promote the welfare of the people. Which lies in safeguarding their faith, 
their life, their intellect, their posterity and their wealth. Whatever ensures 
the safeguarding of these five serves public interest and is desirable.” From the 
above quote we can see that Sharia emphasis is on society and the need to en-
sure a stewardship of the assets under management.
Drawing upon the Ideas of leadership highlighted in the Islamic principles, 
Stewardship theory is more applicable in Islamic banks rather than forming 
a governance structure based solely on the assumption that managers are self-
serving and should be treated as agents. Moreover Abdullah Saif Alnasser and 
Muhammed (2012) suggest any governance structure for IBs should utilize the 
stakeholder theory to insure they fulfil their purpose and achieve long-term 
success. Additionally, Grais and Pellegrini (2006) claimed that the moral codes 
of Islam might enhance the ethical behaviour of managers in banks. Despite 
the strong moral principles there is the ever-present danger of the agency 
costs, particularly in the case of Islamic banking when you have a more com-
plex agency problem caused by the existence of investment account holders 
which suffer from a lack of representation under the traditional governance 
structure (Safieddine, 2009).
This paper adopts a theoretical stance aligned with the ideas presented by 
Davis et al. (1997); Obid and Naysary (2014) that there is no one-best fit the-
ory for all organisations and applicable under all circumstances. This paper 
embraces the idea of reconciling the different theories to recognize which one 
is leading to a better governance structure serving the best interest of major 
stakeholders. Nonetheless, this paper emphasises that corporate governance in 
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Islamic banks is affected not only by local cultures and regulations mentioned 
earlier by Solomon (2013) but also by the ideas of leadership highlighted in the 
Islamic rules and philosophy. Therefore, the focus of Stewardship in this paper 
which embraces the core dogma of Islam without neglecting the importance 
of Stakeholder and Agency theories.
1.5. Enhanced shareholder activism
The debate on active shareholders, such as institutional shareholders and their 
effect on companies’ governance, is not a new phenomenon. The debate has 
been ongoing for decades and can be traced back to the early 90s (Cadbury 
committee, 1992, cited by Banaga et al., 1995; Goranova & Ryan, 2014; McNulty 
& Nordberg, 2016; Armitage, Haig & Hodgkinson, 2017).
Archer and Abdel Karim (2007) argue that corporate governance adopted 
by western banks is not inconsistent with the requirement of Islamic princi-
ples. However, a number of additional features should be implemented over 
and above conventional models and theories of corporate governance to be 
compliant with Islamic principles. Therefore, it would be only rational to build 
upon the existing models and research of contemporary corporate governance 
and implement the required features to suit the mechanisms and products of 
Islamic finance.
Goranova and Ryan (2014, p. 1232) defined shareholder activism as “actions 
taken by shareholders with the explicit intention of influencing corporations’ 
policies and practices, rather than as latent intentions implicit in ownership 
stakes or trading behavior.” As an example the UK Stewardship Code (2012) 
argues that the investors’ role must exceed beyond just simply voting to in-
clude activities such as engaging, managing, strategies and corporate govern-
ance. McNulty and Nordberg draw a useful distinction between the episodic 
and change-orientated activism identified by Goranova and Ryan and stew-
ardship/engagement aimed at mutual understanding.
On the other hand, the Islamic Financial Services Act 2013 (IFSA), as cited 
by the Central Bank of Malaysia (2014, p. 1), “distinguishes investment account 
from Islamic deposit”. These investments could be divided to three main types 
‘Mudarabah’ contracts which is an equity-like instrument based on the part-
nership principle including profit and loss sharing, where one party is provid-
ing capital and the other party managing the asset (Minhat & Dzolkarnaini, 
2016). ‘Musharakah’ which is equity partnership combining the act of invest-
ment and management (Iqbal & Mirakhor, 2007). Finally, ‘Wakalah’ which is 
a contractual relationship between two parties one is acting as an agent to per-
form specific tasks to the other party either voluntarily or with associated fees 
(Central Bank of Malaysia, 2014).
Drawing upon the above, it is concluded that IAHs could be treated as eq-
uity investors since they provide capital and participate in profits and losses. 
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Moreover, IAHs should act alongside shareholders actively and responsibly 
seeking to enhance the stewardship practice in their bank which consequently 
will be able to achieve long-term success and sustainable performance.
2. Proposed conceptual model of corporate governance in 
Islamic banks
This research aims to incorporate the three main theories underpinning corpo-
rate governance and corporate governance in IBs specifically into an over-arch-
ing model. Firstly, Principal/Agent theory is a key theory in corporate govern-
ance and is seen as fundamental in corporate governance in Islamic banks. The 
focus is on reducing agency costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Cuevas-Rodriguez 
et al., 2012). Secondly, this model employs a governance structure taking pri-
mary stakeholders into consideration since most of the Islamic literature on 
Islamic finance argues that any Islamic corporations should be serving the pub-
lic good and expand its purpose beyond the financial needs of its shareholders 
in an attempt to fulfil the non-financial needs of its primary stakeholders based 
on moral and Islamic values (Chapra & Ahmed, 2002; Grais & Pellegrini, 2006; 
Abdullah Saif Alnasser & Muhammed, 2012). Finally, stewardship theory acts 
as the pre-eminent element in this model guiding directors in Islamic banks 
to both monitor and trust their managers encouraging them to act as stewards 
and work for the best interest of their banks (Donaldson & Davis, 1991; Davis 
et al., 1997; Cuevas-Rodriguez et al., 2012).
In addition to the three theories identified above, the proposed conceptual 
model (Figure 2) draws on three main codes of practice. Firstly, the UK stew-
ardship code published by the Financial Reporting Council (FRC 2012) which 
is considered as one of the most substantial moves to engage shareholders as ac-
tive owners (McNulty & Nordberg, 2010; Nordberg, 2017). Secondly, “Guiding 
principles on corporate governance for institutions offering only Islamic finan-
cial services” published by the Islamic financial services board (IFSB 2006) and 
deliberated by the literature of many scholars such as (Archer & Abdel Karim 
2007). Thirdly, the “Investment Account” policy published by the Central Bank 
of Malaysia (2014) being a leading country in Islamic finance. Moreover, this 
“Investment Account” policy aims to set the guiding principles on the treat-
ment of investment account holders. This policy document was set to ensure 
four main areas for IAHs: firstly, ensure compliance with the Sharia principles. 
Secondly, to establish a sound risk management structure to manage the assets 
of IAHs in order to safeguard the stakeholders’ interests including the IAHs. 
Thirdly, to set a minimum disclosure requirement enabling IAHs to make in-
formed decisions this will boost the performance of the IFIs. Fourthly, this 
policy is set to ensure the sustainability of the Islamic financial system by sup-
porting a robust risk management structure.
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The policy divides into two types of structuring: Standard that must be 
complied with ‘S’ or advisory guidance ‘G’. Figure 1 is a representation of The 
UK Stewardship Code, 2012 (Financial Report Council, 2012). In this repre-
sentative model the stewardship responsibility is shared between the board 
of directors and the institutional investors. Boards hold primary responsible 
for the stewardship practice by monitoring/trust managers’ activities, while 
institutional investors are responsible for holding the board accountable for 
its stewardship responsibilities through the asset managers employed by the 
institutional investors. Consequently, the UK code of corporate governance 
(Financial Report Council, 1992/2016) acts to enhance the effectiveness and 
efficiency of corporate governance. Moreover, this model is mainly concerned 
with institutional investors such as pension funds, insurance companies, in-
vestment trusts and collective investment vehicles that provide the capital to 
the asset managers who manage the assets on behalf of the institutional in-
vestors. Consequently, these investment owners “set the tone of stewardship” 
and may influence a behaviour change and improve the corporate culture.
Banaga et al. (1995) claimed that while there has been an ongoing discus-
sion on the role of institutional investors for over two decades the reality re-
mains a strategy of ‘exist’ i.e. the sale of shares in response to poor financial 
performance rather than active engagement in the governance of companies 
by institutional investors.
Figure 2 provides a representation of the proposed conceptual model for 
corporate governance in Islamic banks. This model extends figure (1), the 
Stewardship model, by incorporating IAHs as unique to IBs and considered 
one of the most substantial stakeholders (Archer & Karim, 2007). Their in-
vestment is crucial to Islamic banks and should be well protected. Moreover, 
Archer and Abdel Karim (2007) argue that IAHs are like ‘quasi-equity holders’ 
with the former having no power on how this institution is governed. Thus, 
IAHs have no protection and rely on the sympathy of policy makers and the 
Sharia board. Therefore, this conceptual model presents IAHs as a form of ac-
tive shareholder/Institutional investors with an entitlement to engage in a stew-
ardship role in the Islamic bank.
Under the proposed model both the board and the IAHs engage in stew-
ardship of the bank. However, due to the unique structure of Islamic banks the 
board of directors share the responsibility with the sharia supervisory board 
which advise the board on all Sharia principles. Moreover, the Governance 
Committee suggested by the (IFSB 2006) shown in (Figure 2) represents a par-
allel to the UK code. Furthermore, IFSB (2006) suggests that the Governance 
Committee could consist of:
The governance committee oversees and monitors the application of the 
governance framework in addition to providing the Islamic banks’ board with 
reports and recommendation designed to enhance the accountability and the 
effectiveness of the board. Therefore, this Governance Committee is considered 
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a key player in reducing agency costs. The Central Bank of Malaysia (2014) goes 
further by suggesting the formation of a risk management committee designed 
specifically to provide a more robust risk management for the IAHs. This paper 
suggests the amalgamation of both committees to form the governance and risk 
committee as shown in (Figure 2) which is responsible for providing a robust 
risk structure for IAHs. Finally, the model adopts the recommendation of the 
Central Bank of Malaysia (2014) that a board investment committee should 
be formed when the investment account constitutes a significant proportion 
of the total assets in the bank. Nonetheless, it is the boards’ responsibility to 
determine the significant of this investment.
Conclusions
This paper highlights the unique position of corporate governance in Islamic 
banks and proposes a model for further development combining the fundamen-
tal philosophical principles of Islam with the theories and practical structures, 
codes and systems developed in the West. The Investment Account Holders 
are identified as significant stakeholders and are given a pivotal role in the pro-
posed conceptual model. The model proposes to combine the recommenda-
tions of both the Central Bank of Malaysia (2014) and the Islamic Financial 
Supervisory Board (2006) through the formation of a  governance and risk 
management committee designed to enhance the efficiency and the account-
ability of the Board of Directors. These inclusions together with integration of 
a Sharia supervisory board are designed to improve the corporate governance 
in Islamic banks and provide assurance to all primary stakeholders that all the 
investments and activities are compliant with the Islamic principles.
On a final note and in the light of the recent banking crisis it may be of in-
terest to Western governments and bank regulators to reflect on the found-
ing principles of Islamic banks where the focus is on real assets, sustainability, 
wide stakeholder engagement with specific attention to society and the pub-
lic good–attributes that have widespread appeal to global society whether of 
Western or Eastern persuasion.
References
Abdullah Saif Alnasser, S. & Muhammed, J. (2012). Introduction to corpo-
rate governance from Islamic perspective. Humanomics, 28(3), 220-231. 
doi:10.1108/08288661211258110
Abu-Tapanjeh, A. M. (2009). Corporate governance from the Islamic perspective: 
A comparative analysis with OECD principles. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 
20(5), 556-567.
131B. Alatassi, S. Letza, Best practice in bank corporate governance: The case of Islamic banks
Archer, S. & Abdel Karim, R. A. (2007). Islamic finance: The regulatory challenge. 
Chichester: John Wiley.
Armitage, S., Haig, A. & Hodgkinson, L. (2017). Is an investing institution one share-
holder or a collection of separate funds?. Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, 25(1), 20-40. doi:10.1111/corg.12159 
Banaga, A., Ray, G. & Tomkins, C. (1995). A conceptual framework for corporate gov-
ernance and effective management. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 
3(3), 128-137. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8683.1995.tb00108.x
Bhatti, M. & Bhatti, I. (2009). Development in legal issues of corporate govern-
ance in Islamic finance. Journal of Economic and Administrative Sciences, 25(1), 
67-91.
Cadbury, A. (1992). The financial aspects of corporate governance. Retrieved from GB:
Cadbury, A. (2002). Corporate governance and chairmanship: A personal view. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
Central Bank of Malaysia. (2014). Investment Account. Malaysia: Bank Negara Malaysia. 
Retrieved from http://www.bnm.gov.my/guidelines/01_banking/04_prudential_
stds/investment_account.pdf
Chapra, M. U. (1992). Islam and the economic challenge. Leicestershire: The Islamic 
Foundation.
Chapra, M. U. & Ahmed, H. (2002). Corporate governance in Islamic financial insti-
tutions. Occasional Paper, 6.
Clarke, T. (2004). Theories of corporate governance: The philosophical foundations of 
corporate governance. London: Routledge.
Cuevas-Rodríguez, G., Gomez-Mejia, L. R. & Wiseman, R. M. (2012). Has agency the-
ory run its course?: Making the theory more flexible to inform the management of 
reward systems. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 20(6), 526-546. 
doi:10.1111/corg.12004
Davis, J. H., Schoorman, F. D. & Donaldson, L. (1997). Toward a Stewardship theory of 
management. The Academy of Management Review, 22(1), 20-47. doi:10.2307/259223
de Haan, J. & Vlahu, R. (2016). Corporate governance of banks: A survey. Journal of 
Economic Surveys, 30(2), 228-277. doi:10.1111/joes.12101
Dermine, J. (2013). Bank corporate governance: Beyond the global banking crisis. 
Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments, 259-281.
Donaldson, L., & Davis, J. H. (1991). Stewardship theory or agency theory: CEO 
governance and shareholder returns. Australian Journal of Management, 16(1), 
49-64.
Financial Report Council. (1992/2016). The UK corporate governance code 2016. 
Retrieved from https://www.frc.org.uk/directors/corporate-governance-and-stew-
ardship/uk-corporate-governance-code
Financial Report Council. (2012). The UK Stewardship Code 2012. Retrieved from: 
https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/d67933f9-ca38-4233-b603-3d24b2f62c5f/
UK-Stewardship-Code-(September-2012).pdf
Ernst & Young. (2015). World Islamic Banking Competitiveness Report.
Ernst & Young. (2016). World Islamic Banking Competitiveness Report.
Freeman, R. E. (2010). Strategic management: A stakeholder approach. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
132 Economics and Business Review, Vol. 4 (18), No. 4, 2018
Friedman, M. (2007). The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits. In 
W. C. Zimmerli, M. Holzinger & K. Richter (Eds.), Corporate ethics and corporate 
governance (pp. 173-178). Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer.
Goranova, M. & Ryan, L. V. (2014). Shareholder activism. Journal of Management, 
40(5), 1230-1268. doi:10.1177/0149206313515519
Grais, W. & Pellegrini, M. (2006). Corporate governance in institutions offering Islamic 
financial services issues and options. (Working Papers S4054). World Bank Policy 
Research.
Grassa, R. & Matoussi, H. (2014). Corporate governance of Islamic banks. International 
Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Finance and Management, 7(3), 346-362. 
doi:10.1108/imefm-01-2013-0001
IFSB (Islamic Finacial Supervisory Board). (2006). Guiding principles on corporate 
governance for institutions offering only islamic financial services (excluding Islamic 
insurance (takaful) institutions and Islamic mutual funds). Retrieved from http://
www.ifsb.org/standard/ifsb3.pdf
Iqbal, Z. & Mirakhor, A. (2007). An introduction to Islamic finance: theory and prac-
tice. Singapore: John Wiley.
Irfan, H. (2013). Could Islamic finance save capitalism?. Retrieved from https://www.
theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2014/dec/04/could-islamic-finance-solu-
tion-capitalism
Jensen, M. C. (2001). value maximization, stakeholder theory, and the cor-
porate objective function. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 14(3), 8-21. 
doi:10.1111/j.1745-6622.2001.tb00434.x
Jensen, M. C. & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, 
agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305-
-360. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X
John, K., De Masi, S. & Paci, A. (2016). Corporate governance in banks. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 24(3), 303-321.
Khan, M. S. & Mirakhor, A. (1989). The Financial System and Monetary Policy in an 
Islamic Economy. Journal  of King  Abdulaziz University: Islamic Economics, 1(1), 
85-93.
Letza, S. & Sun, X. (2002). Corporate governance: paradigms, dilemmas and beyond. 
Poznan Economic Review, 2(1), 43-59.
Letza, S. & Sun, X. (2004). Philosophical and paradoxical issues in corporate govern-
ance. International Journal of Business Governance and Ethics, 1(1), 27-44.
Letza, S., Sun, X. & Kirkbride, J. (2004). Shareholding versus stakeholding: A critical 
review of corporate governance. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 
12(3), 242-262.
Letza, S., Kirkbride, J., Sun, X. & Smallman, C. (2008). Corporate governance theoris-
ing: limits, critics and alternatives. International Journal of Law and Management, 
50(1), 17-32. doi:doi:10.1108/03090550810852086
Letza, S. (2017). Corporate governance and the African business context: The case of 
Nigeria, Economics and Business Review, 3(1), 184-204.
Levine, R. (2004). The corporate governance of banks: A concise discussion of concepts 
and evidence. World Bank Open Knowledge Repository.
133B. Alatassi, S. Letza, Best practice in bank corporate governance: The case of Islamic banks
Macey, J. R. & O’Hara, M. (2003). The corporate governance of banks. Economic Policy 
Review, 9(1).
Mallin, C. (2013). Corporate governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
McNulty, T. & Nordberg, D. (2016). Ownership, activism and engagement: Institutional 
investors as active owners. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 24(3), 
346-358. doi:10.1111/corg.12143
Minhat, M. & Dzolkarnaini, N. (2016). Islamic corporate financing: Does it promote profit 
and loss sharing (1467-8608)?. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/beer.12120.
Mollah, S. & Zaman, M. (2015). Shari’ah supervision, corporate governance and per-
formance: Conventional vs. Islamic banks. Journal of Banking and Finance, 58, 418-
-435. doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2015.04.030
Muneeza, A., & Hassan, R. (2014). Shari’ah corporate governance: the need for a spe-
cial governance code. Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Effective 
Board Performance, 14(1), 120-129. doi:10.1108/CG-02-2011-0015
Nordberg, D. (2010). Corporate governance: principles and issues. London: Sage.
Nordberg, D. (2017). Board ethos and institutional work: Developing a corporate gov-
ernance identity through developing the UK code. Economics and Business Review, 
3(1), 73-96.
Obid, S. N. S. & Naysary, B. (2014). Toward a comprehensive theoretical framework for 
Shariah governance in Islamic financial institutions. Journal of Financial Services 
Marketing, 19(4), 304.
Religions. (2009). Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/prac-
tices/zakat.shtml
Safieddine, A. (2009). Islamic financial institutions and corporate governance: New 
insights for agency theory. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 17(2), 
142-158. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8683.2009.00729.x
Solomon, J. (2013). Corporate governance and accountability. John Wiley.
Walker, D. (2009). A review of corporate governance in UK banks and other financial in-
dustry entities – Final recommendations. Retrieved from http://webarchive.nation-
alarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/walker_review_261109.pdf
Warde, I. (2000). Islamic finance in the global economy. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press.
World Islamic Banking Competitiveness Report 2014-15. (2015). Retrieved from https://
www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-world-islamic-banking-competitiveness-
report-2014-15/$FILE/EY-world-islamic-banking-competitiveness-report-2014-15.
pdf
World Islamic Banking Competitiveness Report 2016 New realities New opportunities. 
(2016). Retrieved from https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-world-
islamic-banking-competitiveness-report-2016/$FILE/ey-world-islamic-banking-
competitiveness-report-2016.pdf
